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ABSTRACT 
This paper is the Introductory chapter to my forthcoming book, Knowledge, 
Organization, and Property Rights: Selected Essays of Nicolai J Foss, to be 
published by Edward Elgar in 2008. It provides a brief bio-statement and then 
discusses and places in context the various papers in the collection. The papers in 
the book are listed in the Appendix.  
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 BACKGROUND 
Economics  
I have been happily employed for almost two decades at a business school (namely, 
Copenhagen Business School), I entertain broad and diverse interests (no doubt too many for 
a serious scholar), and I consider myself to be management scholar. I have never been to a 
meeting in the American Economic Association. Still, the dominant disciplinary influence on 
my research has been, and remains, economics. What is published in the better sociology 
journals is no doubt serious research of considerable relevance to management research, and 
the same may be said of much research in social psychology. However, psychologists have 
little idea of the notion of action relative to constraints, and sociologists usually over-
emphasize certain constraints over others. In my opinion, one of the main advantage of 
economics as a social science is that its ability to neatly frame problems is superior. To be 
sure, the framing may often be simplistic (as in the way economists deal with incentives, 
usually ignoring motivation crowding out effects, Frey and Stutzer, 2007), but it is seldom a 
bad starting point (those crowding out effects can be modelled as a refinement of the basic 
model).  
I suppose I was from a relatively early age an intuitive economist; at any rate, I 
remember taking the position in a class in 7th grade in elementary school that, on the whole, 
organized crime should be preferred relative to un-organized crime, as there would be more 
crime under the latter situation than under the former. My teacher and classmates reacted 
with disgust. I remember brief exposures to economics in high school and finding it highly 
fascinating, not the least because of the moral fervour that my left-wing teachers could 
mobilize against the latest sinister plots of the sycophants of Anglo-Saxon/US capitalism, 
that of monetarism (Klein [2008] is really nothing new); predictably, I became a staunch 
monetarist (and buying into the complementary political positions as well) in University 
(where I encountered the same attitude, albeit with a bit more sophistication). I had little 
hesitation that I had made the right choice when I embarked upon the economics program of 
the University of Copenhagen beginning of September 1983 at the tender age of eighteen.  
Copenhagen University  
 Economics at the University in those days were split between macro-oriented 
empiricists and mathematical, general equilibrium theorists (luckily, many of the schisms of 
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two decades back have been overcome today). While the former had much standing in the 
Danish community, the latter had the standing in the scientific community. Econometric 
model building was also very strong. Only one or two professors did what may be called 
“applied price theory,” so the use of economics as a tool to make sense of the choices people 
make in the real world and how these choices aggregate to collective outcomes ⎯ my main 
motivation for studying economics ⎯  was not stressed. The implications of the missing 
linkages between these areas were very clear in the teaching that students were exposed to 
(although it is nothing like the disciplinary diversity that management students are exposed 
to): Things didn’t really seem to connect, so students made choices rather early in the study 
program to focus on either “micro” or “macro. Most focused on macro; this was where 
money and power were, that is, positions with the major banks or ministries.  
 The majority of the teaching in the bachelor part of the economics program centred on 
macro-issues, and I rapidly developed a strong dislike for the kind of boring macro-drill that 
we were exposed to. Things began to change when I realized in the second year of my 
economics study that there were strong alternatives to the Keynesian-macroeconomics-and-
macro-econometric-modelling focus of so much of the teaching. The methodological essays 
of Robert Lucas (1977, 1980) and Milton Friedman’s Presidential Address to the American 
Economic Association (Friedman, 1968) in particular captured my interest, probably because 
they were bashed by my macro teachers (I do admit to having a querulous tendency in my 
nature). 
 At one of my raids at the liberary of the Economics Department, I picked up an old, 
dusty volume with the appealing title, The Fallacy of the New Economics (Hazzlitt, 1959). It 
turned out to be an energetic (though over-the-top) smashing of the Keynesian revolution 
(my Keynesian macro instructor eagerly picked it up when he saw it on my desk, expecting 
it to be an attack on new classical macroeconomics; after flipping through it he put it down 
again with a disgusted look). When researching the author, I found out that he had been 
associated with an “Austrian School of Economics.” At about the same time I was reading 
Axel Leijonhufvud’s brilliant On Keynesian Economics and the Economics of Keynes 
(1968), a very different attempt (and one with which I felt more sympathetic) to furnish 
micro-foundations for macro-economics than new classical macroeconomics. That book 
contained references to a “Friedrich Hayek,” and when checking up on that name I again 
encountered the enigmatic “Austrian School.”  
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 This led, of course, to the discovery of the writings of Hayek, as well as Mises, 
Kirzner, Lachmann, and other modern Austrians, as well as the classical liberal tradition in 
political philosophy. I did not become a die-hard Austrian (I have usually thought of myself 
as a fellow-traveller), but I found, and continue to find, the basic Austrian vision highly 
congenial and inspiring. However, I fundamentally like and admire so-called mainstream 
economics, and although disequilibrium, process, entrepreneurship, and the subjectivism of 
knowledge and expectations continue to be soft spots in the mainstream corpus, the 
mainstream seems to me to increasingly make very serious and sustained attempts at coming 
to grips with the kind of issues that have been central to the Austrians.1 It was also about this 
time (i.e., towards the end of the 1980s) that I discovered new institutional economics, that 
is, transaction cost economics and property rights economics. I remember struggling with 
Alchian’s famous 1965 property rights paper, and finally experiencing a sort of epiphany: 
This kind of reasoning simply made (almost perfect) sense of the world!  I have continued to 
be highly, and in fact increasingly, sympathetic to the new institutional economics, and to 
pursue applications of this body of economics in management research.   
 However, in spite of this interest in new institutional economics I decided to write my 
master thesis, completed in late 1988, on the business cycle theory of Hayek (e.g., Hayek, 
1931) (parts of the thesis were later published as Foss, 1996). After submitting the thesis, my 
thesis supervisor, Professor Hector Estrup ⎯ an expert in the now unfortunately largely 
defunct field of the history of economics ⎯ managed to get me a 6 months stipend at the 
Economics Department at the University, but it became clear that my interest in pursuing 
doctrinal history studies in monetary theory did not resonate well with the current research 
strategies of that Department, so when I was offered a stipend to pursue graduate studies at 
the Copenhagen Business School, I happily accepted.  
Copenhagen Business School  
                                                 
1 Thus, the theme of my 1994 book, The Austrian School and Modern Economics: Essays in Reassessment, 
written as a hobby project while I was working on my PhD thesis, is that although the Austrians, particularly 
Mises and Hayek, anticipated numerous themes that later became prominent in mainstream economics (e.g., 
asymmetric information, the agency problem, property rights), they failed to develop these ideas sufficiently 
and they failed to do concrete theorizing with them. As an example, although the Austrians had many of the 
necessary ingredients of an economic approach to organization before anyone else, they never thought of 
piecing them together. Thus, Austrian economics, though sound in its basic vision, seemed to me to constitute 
an instance of what Lakatos (1970) called a “degenerating research program” (see also Foss, 2000).  
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 I arrived at CBS October 1 1989. CBS in those days was something very far indeed 
from the present highly entrepreneurial, energetic and research-oriented place: There was 
rather little emphasis on research, few senior people seemed interested in assuming a 
mentoring role (perhaps few could), there was no course work to be done, so as a PhD 
student one was pretty much left to pursue one’s own interests for three years. The only 
expectation was that one would produce a monograph, typically in Danish, and minimum 
250 pages long. Quite predictably, most PhD students were not able to finish in time: 
without the checks on procrastination provided by courses and teaching, time just slipped 
through the fingers of the students.  
 However, a cohort of particularly talented PhD students was hired at roughly that time.  
These included Kirsten Foss, Torben Pedersen, Bent Petersen, and Steen Thomsen who all 
since became professors. Also, I was lucky to become associated with some senior people 
who were quite research active. In particular, my advisor on the thesis project, Christian 
Knudsen, took a broad interest in economic theories of the firm, an interest that was clearly 
contagious for I soon developed a similar interest. Since little or no course work was 
required, it was to a large extent up to the above cohort to imprint itself. There were obvious 
negative sides to this (it is difficult to learn statistics in this manner!), but also the benefits 
that come from the feeling of being part of an exciting emerging perspective (we all shared a 
fascination with new institutional economics), a certain esprit de corps. To illustrate, a 
number of us were literally lined up at the CBS library eagerly waiting for the arrival of the 
issue of the Administrative Science Quarterly that featured Williamson (1991) (obviously, 
this was before internet access). The conferment of the Nobel Prize to Ronald Coase in 1992 
gave rise to celebrations. The discovery of the emerging resource-based view in the 
beginning of the 1990s was also a major event.  We increasingly found that we shared an 
emerging perspective (for the rest of the story, including various organizational 
ramifications, see Foss, 2007).  
 My PhD thesis, submitted in 1992 was essentially an application of capabilities and 
transaction cost economics to the issue of the organization of technological innovation, an 
undertaking that was heavily inspired by the work of David Teece (1986) and Richard 
Langlois (1988). I foolishly wrote the thesis in Danish (very few management PhD students 
and even economics PhD students wrote their theses in English at that time), but managed to 
get virtually the whole thesis published as articles translated, of course, from the Danish text.   
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 I was enthused to recognize that many of the ideas on privately held knowledge, 
dynamics, impediments to exchange and rational agents circumventing those impediments, 
spontaneous development of institutions, entrepreneurship, and so on that I (perhaps more or 
less correctly) associated with the Austrian School were part of the core ideas that were 
taught in business schools. They were also rather closely associated to ideas that were 
becoming prominent in the business schools in those days, such as insights derived from 
evolutionary economics (notably the evolutionary theory of the firm and it “capabilities,” 
“dynamic capabilities,” etc. offspring) (Nelson and Winter, 1982), and transaction cost 
economics (Williamson, 1985). I decided that a business school would be an ideal research 
environment, given the basic outlook I held. Not an unusual decision for a failed economist 
(or failed sociologist, for that matter)!  
 I have followed the traditional career path of Assistant (1993), Associate (1996) and 
Full Professor (1998), all at the Copenhagen Business School, and added adjunct 
professorships at the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration and 
Agder University. During the twenty years I have spent professionally at CBS, I have 
witnessed the growth of the school from being a sleepy, provincial and almost wholly 
teaching-oriented university to become one of the World’s largest business schools with 400 
faculty, about 17.000 students, marked ambitions, and a strong emerging research culture 
that increasingly results in publications in the best international management and 
disciplinary journals. This growth has come about as a result of a fruitful interplay between 
local initiative and a management approach at CBS that has stressed guidance and 
orchestration of initiatives rather than piecemeal management. Rather than adopting a 
uniform model of the organization of a research-based organization (e.g., emulating the 
typical US business school), or dictating research initiatives from the top, the architect of 
CBS’ growth experience, President Finn Junge-Jensen emphasized a bottom-up approach. In 
his approach to stimulating school-wide research activities, somewhat reminiscent of the 
Oticon “spaghetti organization” (treated in “Selective Intervention and Internal Hybrids: 
Interpreting and Learning from the Rise and Decline of the Oticon Spaghetti 
Organization”), local entrepreneurial research initiative would be supported, sometimes very 
generously, once it had passed an initial and not very rigorous screening procedure. 
Typically, such efforts would be organized in a research center, encompassing between five 
and twenty scholars. Currently, CBS has almost forty such centers. A more serious 
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evaluation would happen later; thus, selection was rather ex post than ex ante. The whole, 
largely successful, exercise is a prime example of “guided evolution” (Ghoshal and Løvas, 
2000) in an academic context. I have myself been a beneficiary of this approach, as my 
research has been generously supported, and I am now the director of The Center for 
Strategic Management and Globalization, a 12 faculty research center devoted to research in 
international business and strategic management (more on the Center in Foss, 2007).  
  
RESEARCH INTERESTS AND THE PAPERS IN THIS COLLECTION2 
Early Work 
As is usually the case, the research I did for my PhD thesis has very much shaped my 
subsequent work. My thesis work drew on the industrial economics tradition of post-
Marshallians such as Edith Penrose (1959), George Richardson (1972), and Brian Loasby 
(1976), evolutionary economics in the Nelson and Winter (1982) tradition, and 
Williamsonian transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1985, 1996). The thesis was very 
much taken up with meta-issues, specifically issues of theory comparison and integration 
and the underpinning of such discussions in the theory of science. This interest has never left 
me, and although much of my work over the last decade or so has been empirical and 
relatively conventional management research, I keep returning to it. Although it is easy to 
risk being branded as somebody who does work that is “merely conceptual” or writes 
“thought pieces” (an academic putdown if there ever was one!), it is my strongly held 
conviction that in an inherently multi-disciplinary field such as management research, the 
risk of fundamental confusion is an ever-present danger and the need for a high degree of 
reflexivity is warranted. Efforts that make an attempt to sort out the fundamental theoretical 
and methodological issues should therefore be welcomed. Perhaps because this is where my 
heart (mainly) is, these kinds of papers are over-represented in the present collection, as well 
as in my paper portfolio in general.  
One of the chapters in the thesis was published as Foss (1993a), one of my first and 
most cited papers (but not included here because I am not happy anymore with the style and 
message of the paper). Much of my PhD thesis dealt with what foundational and conceptual 
issues, such as the philosophical doctrine of realism and economics (Foss, 1994c), the 
                                                 
2 Check www.nicolaifoss.com for a complete listing of publications plus some downloadable papers.  
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functionalist mode of explanation of transaction cost economics (Foss, 1994d), and the 
epistemic assumptions of transaction cost economics (Foss, 1993b, 1994d). Most of this 
work linked up with the evolutionary research programme in economics. The work of 
Richard Langlois (1992; Langlois and Robertson, 1995) was a huge source of inspiration, as 
was the work of Brian Loasby (1976, 1991), and the modern semi-formal evolutionary 
economics associated with Nelson and Winter (1982). Although I have problems with some 
of the key constructs of this approach (notably, notions of routines and capabilities), in its 
application to the theory of markets I see it as an interesting and laudable return to and 
updating of an older and more “realistic” and processual tradition in economics, one that was 
taken up with the analysis of changes rather than the comparison of equilibrium states. It is 
not surprising that it has been such a strong source of inspiration for management scholars.  
At about the time I did this kind of research I became one of the co-founders of the 
Danish Research Unit of Industrial Economics (DRUID), which (established in 1995) now 
has become a highly successful forum for the latest high quality work in industrial dynamics, 
a sort of European version and blend of the Academy of Management and the Joseph 
Schumpeter Society. The DRUID was conceived of as a vehicle of disseminating the new 
evolutionary economics (i.e., post-Nelson and Winter EE), and although this orientation has 
diminished somewhat it is still strong.  Partly inspired by the ethos of DRUID, I published a 
number of papers throughout the 1990s on the history of economics and management 
research. Thus, I published a couple of papers on the work of Edith Penrose, taking issue 
with the conventional interpretation of this work as the main precursor of strategic 
management’s dominant perspective, the resource-based view (the RBV): Whereas the RBV 
is an equilibrium approach that focuses on the necessary conditions that must obtain for 
resources to yield rents in equilibrium, Penrose stressed growth, resource-building, and the 
dynamics of related diversification, and she was not taken up with competitive advantage per 
se (Foss, 1999b). Brian Loasby (1976) directed my attention to the work of the brilliant but 
neglected economist George B. Richardson (Foss, 1994f, 1995). With Brian Loasby and 
John Kay I arranged a conference in honour of Richardson (on the occasion of his 70th 
birthday) at St. John’s College, Oxford University in 1995 (Foss and Loasby, 1998).  
Richardson had left economics in the mid-1970s to become CEO of Oxford University Press 
in frustration over the lack of interest in his work.  
Capabilities, Resources, and Economic Organization 
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Richardson was, however, the economist who, building from Penrosian foundations, 
coined the notion of firm-level “capabilities.” His thinking on asset specificity and 
complementarity, particularly in his small monograph, Information and Investment (1960), 
was decades ahead of its time.  Richardson was also the first scholar to attempt to explain the 
boundaries of the firm in terms of capabilities, that is, to give provide an (at least seemingly) 
alternative explanation to the Coasian approach. The capabilities notion and the associated 
theorizing seemed to dovetail in various ways with what was going on in the exciting field of 
strategic management that I was discovering at that time, particularly with various 
extensions of the resource-based view (Barney, 1991). It provided, in other words, a very 
fitting bridge for somebody who was in the process of taking the step from economics to 
management research.  
Capabilities have in fact emerged as one of the key constructs in management research. 
The central notion goes straight back to Penrose and Richardson, namely that firms should 
be conceptualized as repositories of routines and capabilities (e.g., Nelson and Winter, 1982; 
Kogut and Zander, 1992) (see also Foss, 1999a; Langlois and Foss, 1999). It is, furthermore, 
asserted in this stream of research that routines and capabilities cause firm-level outcomes 
such as financial performance, innovation, and the boundaries of the firm (e.g., Nelson and 
Winter, 1982; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997). Thus, it is argued 
that explaining firm-level outcomes should take place in terms of other firm-level variables. 
However, the overall problem with such reasoning is that there are no conceivable causal 
mechanisms in the social world that operate solely on the macro level. There are no macro-
level entities on the social domain that somehow possess capacities or dispositions to act 
(Cartwright, 1989) that make them capable of directly producing macro-level outcomes and 
there are no direct processes of interaction between macro-entities.   
Albeit obvious to somebody with a methodological individualist background, this 
recognition has been extremely slow to develop in the strategic management and related 
literatures. Presumably because of the strong dominance of a mode of research that is all 
about building firm-level data bases and engaging in cross-sectional analysis of firm-level 
data, the problem of accounting for the causal mechanisms that actually mediate between the 
analyzed macro- or firm-level has too often been neglected; that is, micro-foundations have 
been black-boxed, whether consciously or unconsciously. In a very brief paper (a note, 
really), “Knowledge-Based Approaches to the Theory of the Firm: Some Critical 
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Comments;” reprinted as the first paper in this collection, I pointed out that existing accounts 
of the link between capabilities and economic organization (e.g., the boundaries of the firm) 
black-boxed or bypassed these micro-foundations so that the link was elusive. The challenge 
has not, it seems to me, yet been satisfactorily addressed in the capabilities literature.  
Micro-foundations and Knowledge Governance 
 In retrospect, the 1996 paper is the origin of two closely related research streams: 
Micro-foundations in strategic management and organization research and what I (borrowing 
from Grandori, 1997) have termed “knowledge governance.”   
 At some point after the 1996 I realized that the problem I had diagnosed in the 1996 
paper was a general one that beset this literature, that is, a lack of micro-foundations. The 
recognition emerged partly as a result of being challenged by my then PhD student Volker 
Mahnke concerning how I, with my Austrian inclinations and therefore presumed sympathy 
to methodological individualism, could be supportive of notions of capabilities and the like.  
However, it took me almost a decade, as well as teaming up with a kindred spirit, namely 
Teppo Felin (Brigham Young University), before I made the point explicitly. Teppo is a 
keen thinker with a taste for the radical argument and I have had the pleasure of 
collaborating with him on quite a number of paper projects. We realized that we shared a 
commitment to a basic rationalist and realist outlook, and, therefore, a strong aversion to the 
social constructivist currents that are now rampant in management research (on this, see 
Felin and Foss, 2008).   
 In our first collaboration, a brief essay titled “Strategic Organization: a Field in 
Search of Microfoundations,” Teppo and I explicitly argue that collective-level constructs 
in strategic management (and related) fields suffer from a general problem of accounting for 
their micro-foundations, which makes it hard to understand how they have emerged and how 
they may be changed.3 Ultimately, the lack of such micro-foundations means that the 
managerial relevance of (very prominent) collective level concepts, such as capabilities and 
absorptive capacity, is unclear: How can managers hope to build capability and absorptive 
capacity if the way in which these are rooted in individual action and interaction is 
fundamentally unclear? Somewhat surprisingly, the paper is probably the first explicit 
                                                 
3 These ideas are pinned out in greater detail in Felin and Foss (2006) and Abell, Felin and Foss (2008) builds a 
formal model of the micro-foundations of capabilities.  
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statement of the problem of lacking micro-foundations in management research.4 However, 
it seems that strategic management is now embarking on a micro-foundations project 
somewhat similar to, and perhaps inspired by, economics and rational choice sociology (e.g., 
Teece, 2007). 
 My concern with the micro-foundations of knowledge-based ideas led ⎯ rather 
naturally, I believe ⎯ to an interest in bounded rationality which I (like no doubt many 
others) had thought of as the natural individual-level underpinning of notions of routines and 
capabilities.  Indeed, modern writers on routines and capabilities refer (routinely) to Simon, 
Cyert and March as important precursors of their work (e.g., Nelson and Winter, 1982). In 
“Bounded Rationality and Tacit Knowledge in the Organizational Capabilities Approach: 
an Evaluation and a Stocktaking,” which was published in 2003 in the Nelson and Winter 
Festschrift issue of Industrial and Corporate Change, I argued that the link between the 
individual level and the organizational level had not been established in moden work, except 
metaphorically (by the argument in Nelson and Winter that “routines are the skills of an 
organization”) and that, at any rate, routines were really more about tacit knowledge than 
about bounded rationality. Thus, bounded rationality was invoked in a merely ceremonial 
manner and not fundamentally inquired into. At the same time I argued that this was a 
broader characteristic of the theory of the firm or organizational economics literature. “The 
Rhetorical Dimensions of Bounded Rationality: Herbert A. Simon and Organizational 
Economics” makes the point that bounded rationality has usually been invoked in a 
rhetorical manner (in a pre-McCloskeyan sense of the word; McCloskey, 1983). Bounded 
rationality is not in general necessary to drive organizational economics arguments, but is 
invoked, perhaps partially out of reverence to Simon (or as an appeal to authority?), as a 
label for a host of things that may make contracts incomplete. I also argued that Simon 
himself had failed in his attempt to persuade economists that bounded rationality is 
important: He hammered away at what it was not (namely, maximizing rationality), but 
failed to truly explain (at least to economics audiences) what it really was.   
                                                 
4 To be sure, micro-foundations were an emerging theme in management research before our paper, though 
usually implicitly. Scholars realize that understanding such issues as value appropriation (Coff, 1997; Lippman 
and Rumelt, 2003a), resource value (Lippman and Rumelt, 2003b), strategy implementation (Barney, 2001), 
and factor market dynamics (Makadok and Barney, 2001), requires that substantial attention be paid to 
explanatory mechanisms that are located at the micro-level, that is, the level of individual action and 
interaction.  
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 My interest in the micro-foundations of knowledge-based views in management also 
led me to what often passes as “knowledge management.” In particular, I have maintained an 
interest in issues of managing knowledge in multinational corporations, an interest I have 
often pursued in collaboration with my CBS colleague, Torben Pedersen, a prominent 
international business scholar. An example of our collaboration is ”Sources of Subsidiary 
Knowledge and Organizational Means of Knowledge Transfer” which takes its point of 
departure in the literature on the “differentiated MNC,” that is, the notion that the such firms 
can be seen as networks of units that each control heterogeneous and potentially 
complementary knowledge assets, and that they may derive advantages relative to national 
firms to the extent that they can build complementarities between such knowledge assets 
(this literature goes back at least to Hedlund, 1986). In the paper we examine the sources of 
the knowledge that is held in subsidiaries and argue that these sources matter greatly to the 
costs and benefits of knowledge transfers inside the MNC. We also argue that MNC 
headquarters can influence subsidiaries’ knowledge sourcing activities. Thus, the paper is an 
attempt to dig deeper in terms of anteceding and moderating influences on MNC knowledge 
management activities. 
 “The Use of Knowledge in Firms,” a play on the title of Hayek’s (1945) famous essay, 
reaches back to my Austrian roots and raises some Austrian concerns relating to the 
treatment of knowledge in the mainstream economics of organization.  It examines the 
drastic simplifications in the knowledge dimension that organizational economists introduce 
in their attempt to achieve theoretical traction, illustrating a quip by Brian Loasby that most 
management problems concern the things that are blackboxed in economics models. 
“Theoretical Isolation in Contract Economics” is almost like a companion paper, but with a 
different, theory of science orientation, specifically looking at the kind of “isolations” 
theorists perform in trying to make their theorizing determinate, and pinning out the specific 
“on-off” modeling approach employed by contract theorists. The “Use of Knowledge in 
Firms” paper surely raises many more questions than it gives answers, but I still believe that 
its basic message is correct, namely that problems of coordination (in the sense of game 
theory) have been neglected in organizational economics. Notions of capabilities in 
management and economics have sometimes been presented in the context of examining the 
coordination of knowledge in the absence of conflicts (see also Foss, 1999), but as already 
suggested, they do not seem to me to have been successful here.  
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One of the many profound insights in Hayek’s (1945) essay is that societal institutions 
should first and foremost be assessed against the extent to which they assist in the creation of 
new knowledge and exploitation of existing knowledge. To be sure this view is at least 
implicit in the knowledge-based view of the firm as well as in work on organizational 
learning (March, 1991) and in work on knowledge management. The idea directs attention to 
how processes of transferring, sharing, integrating, and creating knowledge can be governed 
by means of choices of governance structures (i.e., markets, hybrids, hierarchies; cf. 
Williamson, 1996), as well as the governance mechanisms contained in governance 
structures, such as authority, reward systems, standard operating procedures, ownership, etc.  
(see also Grandori, 1997, 2001).  
In “The Knowledge Governance Approach” I argue that although there has been much 
interest in how organization and knowledge processes relate in management research since 
the mid-1960s, there has been a surprising lack of systematic investigation of how formal 
organisation (governance structures and mechanisms) impacts knowledge processes. 
Organisational governance as a consciously designed effort seems de-emphasized, and the 
organisation-level antecedents that are, in fact, investigated are predominantly variables such 
as prior related knowledge, organisational practices, or structural conditions such as network 
positions, centrality, and the like. However, the relative absence of interest in formal 
organization in large parts of contemporary writings in management research on knowledge, 
is somewhat worrying for a number of reasons: Managers can often more directly influence 
formal organisation than informal organisation; it is usually easier to change job 
descriptions, reward systems, etc. than to effect changes in, for example, corporate culture. 
Indeed, the former may drive the latter with a lag. Evidence suggests that managers do 
change formal organisation in an attempt to influence knowledge processes.  
Cutting thematically across the fields of knowledge management, human resource 
management, organization theory, and strategic management, the knowledge governance 
approach starts from the hypothesis that knowledge processes can be influenced and directed 
through the deployment of governance mechanisms, in particular the formal aspects of 
organization that can be manipulated by management, such as organization structure, job 
design, reward systems, information systems, standard operating procedures, accounting 
systems, and other coordination mechanisms. It is a systematic attempt to address these 
issues, paying explicit attention to micro-issues of motivation and cognition (Grandori, 1997; 
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Osterloh and Frey, 2000), which is strongly inspired by the basic explanatory approach of 
transaction cost economics: Knowledge governance may be conceptualized as a sustained 
attempt to uncover how knowledge transactions ⎯ which differ in their characteristics ⎯ 
and governance mechanisms ⎯ which differs with respect to how they handle transactional 
problems ⎯, are matched, using economic efficiency as the explanatory principle (cf. also 
Nickerson and Zenger, 2004).  
Economic Organization 
 “Coase vs. Hayek: Economic Organization in the Knowledge Economy” grapples 
with knowledge governance issues in a more substantive than methodological way. The 
context of the paper is all sorts of arguments that the emerging knowledge economy is going 
to have strong transformative implications for the boundaries of firms as well as for 
“traditional” authority relations, claims that have flourished in the management literature (as 
well as in popular discourse) over the last decades. The paper develops a framework for 
examining such claims, making use of organization economics insights to examine claims 
that, for example, traditional authority relations and firms boundaries (the “Coasian” 
dimension) are increasingly breaking down as knowledge workers gain bargaining power 
and firms increasingly need to source knowledge beyond their boundaries (the “Hayekian” 
dimension).  
 It is a sort of programmatic paper that set the stage for a number of my subsequent 
research efforts. In particular, it points to the need in organizational economic and 
management research of devoting more effort to conceptualizing authority and to 
understanding the distinct incentive liabilities of authority. The standard notion of authority 
is essentially that of Coase (1937) which assumes that the boss can precisely identify the 
action that an employee should take and command him to take that action. If this is all 
authority was about, it is easy to see that it cannot survive “knowledge economy conditions,” 
that is, an increased reliance on knowledge workers who may have superior information 
about their own action sets and about which actions should efficiently be taken. However, 
authority is also about making delegating decision rights to employees (who may be better 
informed) and deciding on other aspects of organizational design (this is further developed in 
Foss and Foss, 2008b). The incentive problem arises once it is recognized that authority in 
this sense also gives managers the right to renege on, for example, delegation with 
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potentially harmful effects on work motivation.  Productivity and overall firm performance 
may suffer.  
 An example of this line of reasoning is “Selective Intervention and Internal Hybrids: 
Interpreting and Learning from the Rise and Decline of the Oticon Spaghetti 
Organization” which discusses the radical organizational changes that took place in Danish 
hearing aids producer Oticon in the 1990s. In particular, the paper discusses the 
implementation of the so-called spaghetti organization, which was a radical to install market 
mechanisms inside the corporate hierarchy of Oticon, and why this organizational form 
ultimately failed. Although the Spaghetti organization seemingly represented a coherent 
organizational design, the paper argues that the very flat spaghetti organization fell victim to 
managerial meddling with the affairs of sub-ordinates, a meddling that proved strongly 
demotivating and gave rise to a more structured organizational form with more of a distance 
between employees and management. From the point of view of strategic management and 
organizational theory the contribution of the paper is to point to the potential incentive costs 
of strategies of using organizational means (e.g., emulating market organization) to foster 
dynamic capabilities. From the point of view of organizational economics, the contribution 
of this paper is to point to the potential importance of the otherwise neglected (or 
downplayed) phenomenon of managerial opportunism and to suggest that organizational 
form is an important antecedent of internal incentive problems.5  In particular, the paper 
suggests that for property rights reasons ⎯ ultimately, managers do keep residual decision 
rights and credible commitments to not intervene are difficult to establish inside firms ⎯ 
there are limits to how far firms can go in the direction of emulating markets.  This theme is 
also pursued in “Tying the Manager’s Hands: Credible Commitment and Firm 
Organization,” co-authored with Kirsten Foss and Xosé Vázquez, which in contrast to the 
small (well, 1) N research setting of the Oticon plays out in a large-N setting, namely firms 
in the Spanish food and electronics industries.  The specific contribution of the paper is to 
look at the factors (reputation effects, informational distance within the hierarchy, unions, 
etc.) that may constrain the kind of managerial opportunism discussed in the Oticon case.  
 The delegation theme is also discussed in “Performance Pay, Delegation, and 
Multitasking under Uncertainty and Innovativeness: an Empirical Investigation,” which  
                                                 
5 Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2001) lends formal support to the reasoning in the paper.  
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was co-authored with my CBS-colleague, Keld Laursen, a prominent scholar in the 
economics of innovation (see also Laursen and Foss, 2003). In the paper we employ a data 
base originally designed for purposes of innovation research to examine one of the key 
predictions of agency theory, the risk/incentives tradeoff. Finding that support for this 
relation is tenuous, we argue, relying on Jensen and Meckling (1992) and Prendergast 
(2002), that this is likely to be caused by delegation: Firms in uncertainty environments are 
likely to make more use of delegation, but delegation needs to be backed up with relatively 
high-powered incentives to check to moral hazard problem. Although agency theory is 
predicated on delegation (i.e., the principal delegates a task to the agent), our analysis 
suggests that agency theorists need to pay more attention to delegation and how it is linked 
to uncertain environments and asymmetric information (i.e., the agent being more 
knowledgeable about which actions should efficiently be taken than the principal).  
Property Rights 
 With Kirsten Foss I have developed a research stream that attempts to apply the 
economics of property rights (e.g., Coase, 1960; Alchian, 1965; Demsetz, 1967), particularly 
the work of Barzel (1997) to management issues (see also Foss and Foss, 2008a&b). 
(Strategic) management scholars have not traditionally been conversant with the economics 
of property rights so selling these ideas has been a somewhat uphill undertaking. However, 
economics of property rights seems to become an increasingly strong voice in the 
conversation of strategy scholars, particularly in the context of the resource-based view of 
strategy (e.g., Teece, 1986; Oxley, 1999; Kim and Mahoney, 2002, 2005).  
The economics of property rights emerged from the recognition that transactions 
involve the exchange of property rights, rather than the exchange of physical goods per se 
(Coase, 1960). In his pioneering paper, Coase (1960) examines the economic welfare 
implications of the allocation of legally delineated rights (liability rights) to a subset of the 
total uses of an asset, namely those that have (non-pecuniary) external effects on the value 
that  agents’ can derive from their use rights over assets. Coase argues that these implications 
can only be grasped if a break is made with the “faulty concept of a factor of production”; 
the latter should properly be thought of, not as physical entities but as right to perform 
certain actions (Coase, 1960: 155). These rights are property rights.  Coase’s paper gave rise 
to a spate of work on property rights and ownership (e.g., Alchian, 1965; Demsetz, 1967; 
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Barzel, 1997) that developed more refined categorizations of property rights, for example, 
introducing distinctions between use rights, income rights, rights to exclude, and rights to 
alienate resources. Gradually, the economic notion of property rights became dissociated 
from legal notions. Rights to use, etc. assets may conceivably exist in the absence of the 
state, legal system, courts, etc. (Umbeck, 1981). Physical force and/or strong social norms 
may guarantee de facto control.  
 A more recent development is the work of Oliver Hart and his students and colleagues, 
sometimes called the “new property rights view” to distinguish it from the work prompted 
by Coase (1960). As in Williamson’s work, a central assumption is that because of 
transaction costs/bounded rationality, contracts must necessarily be incomplete in the sense 
that the allocation of control (property) rights cannot specified for all future states of the 
world.  Following legal convention, ownership is defined as the possession of residual rights 
of control, that is, rights to control the uses of assets under contingencies that are not 
specified in the contract. By control is meant the ability to exclude other agents from 
deciding on the use of certain assets.  These rights determine the boundaries of the firm: a 
firm is defined as a collection of jointly owned assets.   
 In “Assets, Attributes and Ownership,” Kirsten and I argue that this is a view that 
implicitly starts from the assumption that asset ownership is fully enforceable. However, 
recognizing with Barzel that assets have multiple attributes, and that these may be subject to 
capture in world of positive measurement and enforcement costs, implies that the notion of 
full asset ownership is problematic. Ownership is a function of the costs of enforcement and 
capture and of agents’ abilities to engage in these activities. New property rights theorists 
sidestep these issues by implicitly assuming that residual rights of control are perfectly 
enforced. However, if they are allowed into the analysis, a very different rationale for asset 
ownership (and for who should own an asset) emerges, one that depends on costly 
measurement and on agents being of different types, rather than on asset ownership creating 
threat points under ex post bargaining. This is not to say that the new property rights 
economics is wrong; merely that it is different from the ideas of Coase, Alchian, Demsetz 
and Barzel, and that their approach should not be forgotten under the impact of enthusiasm 
over the ability to put property rights ideas in formal garb.  
 17
This is certainly also the case of strategic management: As Kirsten and I argue in 
“Value and Transaction Costs: How the Economics of Property Rights Furthers the RBV” 
property rights economics brings ideas of transaction costs directly into the picture and thus 
illuminates the transaction costs dimensions of resource value. If resources have multiple 
attributes (uses, functionalities, etc.), overall resource value is determined by the benefits of 
these attributes, net of the costs of protecting property rights to these attributes. Given 
positive protection costs, some attributes will be left in the public domain. Several 
implications follow. For example, a “resource” is an endogenous outcome of processes of 
economizing with transaction costs and the proper unit of analysis may be the resource 
attribute rather than the resource itself. Moreover, the ability to reduce transaction costs (e.g., 
internal agency costs or the costs of transacting with suppliers or customers) can be a distinct 
source of competitive advantage. Indeed, in a broader perspective, the familiar VRIN 
conditions of sustained competitive advantage specify the conditions under which property 
rights to resources are secure.6 In later work we have applied these ideas to understanding 
entrepreneurship in the context of the RBV (Foss and Foss, 2008a) and to understanding the 
transaction cost dimensions of competitive strategy (Foss and Foss, 2008b).  
One of my most frequent collaborators has been Peter G. Klein (University of 
Missouri). Peter’s background as a Williamson student and an Austrian has turned to fit out 
very well with my, roughly similar, theoretical preferences. We have co-authored numerous 
papers, mainly on issues of economic organization and entrepreneurship. “Original and 
Derived Judgment: an Entrepreneurial Theory of Economic Organization” is an example 
of our collaboration (it also includes Kirsten Foss in the author team). It employs property 
rights notions and notions of ownership and does so in the context of entrepreneurship inside 
firms. Traditionally, entrepreneurs have been conceptualized as single persons (or in some 
recent cases, entrepreneurial teams). This tends to suppress that an entrepreneur can make 
employees act in an entrepreneurial manner to further the entrepreneur’s vision, what we call 
“proxy” or “derived” entrepreneurship. Building a simple verbal and graphical model we 
model how much delegation the entrepreneur should optimally choose and we argue (in line 
with the reasoning in the above-mentioned papers) that an important function of ownership 
is that it provides the authority to set optimal levels of delegation.  
                                                 
6 These conditions specify that sustainability of competitive advantage obtains when the resources underlying 
strategies are valuable, rare and costly to imitate and substitute. 
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The final paper in this collection “Economic Freedom and Entrepreneurial Activity: a 
Cross-Country Analysis” (with Christian Bjørnskov) also brings together ideas on property 
rights and entrepreneurship, albeit on a much higher level of analysis. Essentially, the paper 
is an attempt to explain cross-country variation in entrepreneurial activity by means of the 
prevailing property rights structure, that is, economic policy and institutions. Although 
entrepreneurship has been much researched in economics lately, and while the same may be 
said of the link between economic growth and institutions, surprisingly the paper appears to 
be one the first papers (and perhaps the first) dealing empirically with the link between 
entrepreneurship and institutions in the economics literature, using cross-national data. The 
institutions/entrepreneurship link is arguable a link in the overall growth/institutions link, so 
for that reason exploring the former link seems important. We find that the size of the public 
sector and the instability of monetary policy are particularly harmful to entrepreneurial 
activity (another link back to my Austrian pedigree).  
 
CODA 
When approached by Matthew Pittman of Edward Elgar to undertake this project, I was 
initially somewhat hesitant: “Collected papers”-like volumes are usually reliable signals of 
careers that are approaching sunset ⎯ not necessarily a good signal to send when you are in 
your early fourties! In my opinion (and no doubt in some readers’ opinion!), I just got 
started!  Another reason I was hesitant has to do with my steadfast attempt to deny Smithian 
economies of specialization in research: Simply put, I have written about what has interested 
me, which turns out to have been a lot different things, and it is not that easy to see how they 
are connected. After all, my intellectual heroes include thinkers as different as Yoram 
Barzel, James Coleman, Frank Knight, Axel Leijonhufvud, Ludwig von Mises, George 
Richardson, David Teece, and Oliver Williamson. I have benefited from interacting with 
people as different in their outlook as Geoff Hodgson and Yoram Barzel, or JC Spender and 
Anna Grandori, or Ulrich Witt and Oliver Williamson (and I am grateful to them all).  
However, I decided to approach this as a sort of mid-career research report, and as a 
snapshot (or rather, brief documentary) of a series of research programmes that I have 
contributed to get started, programs that surely are still developing. Rather than trying to do 
a comprehensive tracking of my research by including only well-cited papers, I would 
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include those papers 1) that I liked and 2) which have had a more “programmatic” function 
in starting some of my research programmes. Accordingly, the emphasis has been on starting 
points for research programmes rather than very specific manifestations of these. For 
example, over the last few years I have done extensive empirical work on issues of 
knowledge governance and micro-foundations, some of it an organizational behaviour vein. 
However, these research results are not reported here, either because they are still underway 
in the relevant journals or because they are (too) specific manifestations of an overall 
agenda.  
 I am fortunate to have had excellent co-authors, including Peter Abell, Torben 
Andersen, Christian Bjørnskov, Teppo Felin, Peter Klein, Thorbjørn Knudsen, Yasemin Kor, 
Richard Langlois, Lasse Lien, Brian Loasby, Joe Mahoney, Peter Møllgaard, Paul 
Robertson, Keld Laursen, Torben Pedersen, Xosé Vázquez and, last, but most emphatically 
not least, Kirsten Foss. A number of the papers in this collection represent joint work with a 
subset of these. I am happy dedicate this collection to my co-authors.  
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